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Abstract.	  This	  chapter	  considers	  Ernest	  Sosa’s	  contributions	  to	  philosophical	  methodology.	  In	  Section	  1,	  Sosa’s	  approach	  to	  the	  role	  of	  intuitions	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  philosophy	  is	  considered	  and	  related	  to	  his	  broader	  virtue-­‐theoretic	  epistemological	  framework.	  Of	  particular	  focus	  is	  the	  question	  whether	  false	  or	  unjustified	  intuitions	  may	  justify.	  Section	  2	  considers	  Sosa’s	  response	  to	  sceptical	  challenges	  about	  intuitions,	  especially	  those	  deriving	  from	  experimental	  philosophy.	  I	  argue	  that	  Sosa’s	  attempt	  to	  attribute	  apparent	  disagreement	  in	  survey	  data	  to	  difference	  in	  meaning	  fails,	  but	  that	  some	  of	  his	  other,	  more	  general,	  responses	  to	  experimentalist	  sceptics	  succeed.	  Historically,	  one	  of	  the	  central	  motivating	  questions	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  philosophy	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  intuitions.	  It	  is	  said	  that	  philosophers	  often	  make	  use	  of	  intuitions,	  and	  theorists	  consider	  what	  it	  is	  about	  intuitions	  that	  could	  justify	  such	  a	  practice,	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  for	  philosophers	  to	  continue	  to	  use	  intuitions	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  do.	  These	  questions	  define	  a	  significant	  subfield	  in	  metaphilosophy.	  Ernest	  Sosa’s	  is	  among	  the	  most	  influential	  work	  in	  this	  tradition;	  he	  accepts	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  dialectic,	  that	  intuitions	  do	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  philosophy	  as	  practiced,	  and	  argues	  in	  favour	  of	  such	  practice,	  by	  offering	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  intuitions,	  and	  by	  defending	  the	  practice	  of	  appeal	  to	  intuition	  from	  critics.	  These	  two	  elements	  of	  Sosa’s	  work—the	  positive	  story	  about	  intuitions,	  and	  the	  defensive	  responses	  to	  critiques	  of	  intuitions—are	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  contribution.	  We	  consider	  each	  in	  turn.	  
1.	  The	  role	  of	  intuitions	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  philosophy	  If,	  as	  is	  generally	  assumed,	  intuitions	  play	  some	  role	  in	  justifying	  certain	  beliefs,	  it	  is	  correct	  for	  us	  theorists	  to	  inquire	  into	  how	  and	  why	  this	  is	  so.	  
1.1.	  What	  are	  intuitions?	  Invocation	  of	  ‘intuition’	  in	  philosophical	  discussion	  generally	  can	  be	  rather	  diverse.	  Some	  theorists	  intend	  the	  word	  to	  apply	  to	  beliefs—perhaps	  of	  a	  certain	  kind,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  unrestrictedly.	  Kirk	  Ludwig	  considers	  a	  factive	  sense	  of	  ‘intuition’	  amounting	  to	  judgments	  with	  a	  particular	  rational	  etiology1;	  George	  Bealer	  considers	  intuition	  to	  comprise	  a	  sui	  generis	  propositional	  attitude	  with	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ludwig	  (2007).	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distinctive	  phenomenology.2	  Sosa’s	  own	  approach	  to	  intuitions	  falls	  somewhere	  between	  these	  latter	  approaches.	  Like	  Bealer,	  Sosa	  considers	  intuitions	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  felt	  attraction	  toward	  judgment;	  unlike	  Bealer,	  he	  relents	  from	  strong	  claims	  about	  a	  distinctive	  phenomenology,	  or	  intuition’s	  sui	  generis	  status.	  Like	  Ludwig,	  Sosa	  considers	  the	  etiology	  of	  a	  particular	  mental	  state	  to	  be	  central	  in	  establishing	  it	  as	  an	  intuition—Sosa’s	  ‘intuitions’	  are	  attractions	  that	  derive	  only	  from	  the	  entertaining	  of	  their	  particular	  contents.	  But	  where	  Ludwig	  requires	  that	  intuitions	  derive	  from	  conceptual	  competence,	  Sosa	  allows	  for	  intuitions	  that	  reflect	  rational	  errors	  or	  biases,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  stem	  from	  the	  entertaining	  of	  the	  intuited	  content.	  I	  take	  it	  that	  questions	  such	  as	  these	  admit	  of	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  stipulation.	  I	  see	  little	  point	  in	  appealing	  to	  pretheoretic	  intuitions	  about	  ‘intuition’	  to	  settle	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  use	  the	  term,	  and	  I	  suspect	  that	  Sosa	  will	  share	  my	  attitude	  here.	  Let	  us	  therefore	  accept	  Sosa’s	  terminology,	  and	  allow	  that	  intuitions	  are	  certain	  kinds	  of	  attractions	  to	  judge,	  where	  [w]hat	  is	  distinctive	  of	  intuitive	  justification	  is	  …	  its	  being	  the	  entertaining	  
itself	  of	  that	  specific	  content	  that	  exerts	  the	  attraction.	  So,	  intuitions	  are	  attractions	  of	  a	  certain	  sort,	  with	  no	  rational	  basis	  beyond	  the	  conscious	  grasp	  of	  its	  specific	  propositional	  content.3	  (We	  may	  pause	  to	  note	  that	  Sosa’s	  use	  of	  ‘intuition’	  has	  not	  always	  fit	  this	  account;	  Sosa	  (1998),	  for	  instance,	  articulates	  a	  notion	  of	  intuition	  that	  relates	  it	  closely	  to	  counterfactual	  belief.	  However,	  his	  recent	  work	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  converged	  on	  the	  approach	  described	  above,	  and	  so	  it	  will	  be	  our	  focus	  in	  what	  follows.)	  So	  we	  now	  have	  a	  (stipulative)	  account	  of	  what	  intuitions	  are.	  What	  epistemological	  role	  can	  they	  play?	  
1.2.	  Perceptual	  models	  Here	  is	  one	  natural	  idea:	  intuitions	  should	  be	  understood	  by	  analogy	  to	  perceptual	  experiences.	  Just	  as	  my	  sensory	  experiences	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  what	  contents	  I	  am	  justified	  in	  coming	  perceptually	  to	  believe,	  so	  do	  my	  intuitive	  experiences	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  what	  contents	  I	  am	  justified	  intellectually	  to	  believe.	  As	  Sosa	  characterizes	  this	  approach,	  intuitive	  seemings	  play	  a	  mediating	  role	  between	  beliefs	  in	  a	  priori	  propositions,	  and	  those	  contents	  themselves.4	  Sosa	  offers	  three	  arguments	  against	  the	  perceptual	  model	  of	  intuition.	  First,	  intuitions,	  unlike	  perceptual	  experiences,	  are	  epistemically	  evaluable.	  Sosa	  points	  out	  that	  “[a]	  reason	  can	  be	  assigned	  the	  wrong	  weight,	  as	  it	  attracts	  one’s	  assent	  too	  much,	  or	  too	  little.”5	  Sosa	  discusses	  cases	  of	  pernicious	  bias	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Bealer	  (1992),	  (1998).	  3	  Sosa	  (2007a)	  p.	  54,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  4	  Ibid.	  p.	  47.	  5	  Ibid.	  p.	  49.	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enculturation,	  whereby	  the	  consideration	  of	  a	  certain	  propositional	  content	  attracts	  one’s	  assent	  to	  an	  inappropriate	  degree;	  from	  wherever	  it	  may	  derive—cultural	  bias	  or	  elsewhere—I	  think	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  familiar	  enough;	  a	  standard	  form	  of	  philosophical	  debate	  disputes	  the	  proper	  weighting	  of	  various	  particular	  intuitions.	  The	  second	  reason	  Sosa	  suggests	  that	  intuitions	  are	  not	  able	  to	  stand	  as	  analogues	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  that	  visual	  experiences	  play	  a	  role	  in	  perceptual	  justification	  that	  enjoys	  no	  correlate	  in	  the	  case	  of	  intuitive	  judgment.	  Sosa	  writes:	  What	  intuitive	  justification	  lacks	  is	  any	  correlate	  of	  the	  visual	  sensory	  experience	  beyond	  one’s	  conscious	  entertaining	  of	  the	  propositional	  content,	  something	  that	  distinctively	  exerts	  a	  thereby	  justified	  attraction	  to	  assent.	  No	  such	  state	  of	  awareness,	  beyond	  the	  conscious	  entertaining	  itself,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  intuitive	  attraction.6	  Intuitive	  belief,	  Sosa	  says,	  like	  introspective	  belief,	  but	  unlike	  perceptual	  belief,	  involves	  no	  such	  intermediate	  stage.	  The	  third	  reason	  Sosa	  cites	  to	  distinguish	  the	  role	  of	  perceptual	  experience	  from	  that	  of	  intuition	  is	  that	  the	  former	  is,	  in	  typical	  cases,	  causally	  and	  counterfactually	  connected	  to	  both	  the	  resultant	  belief	  and	  its	  content	  itself.	  The	  sun	  causes	  in	  me	  the	  visual	  experience	  as	  if	  it	  is	  sunny;	  this	  in	  turn	  causes	  my	  belief	  to	  the	  same	  effect.	  	  By	  contrast,	  “many	  truths	  known	  intuitively	  lie	  outside	  the	  causal	  order,	  unable	  to	  cause	  experience-­‐like	  intuitions,	  even	  if	  there	  were	  such	  intuitions.	  Nor	  can	  such	  truths	  be	  tracked,	  not	  if	  tracking	  requires	  sensitivity.	  What	  are	  we	  to	  make	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  if	  it	  were	  not	  so	  that	  1+1=2,	  one	  would	  not	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  so?	  Hard	  to	  say,	  but	  that	  is	  what	  tracking	  it	  with	  “sensitivity”	  would	  require.”7	  Let	  us	  consider	  these	  apparent	  differences.	  Sosa	  makes	  much	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  intuitions	  are	  epistemically	  evaluable.	  There	  are	  good	  and	  bad	  dispositions	  to	  assent.	  Some	  intuitions,	  for	  example,	  derive	  from	  unreliable	  sources,	  like	  wishful	  thinking	  or	  unreliable	  enculturation;	  such	  are	  negatively	  rationally	  evaluable,	  and	  any	  belief	  based	  on	  such	  an	  intuition	  is	  thereby	  deficient.	  On	  this	  point,	  there	  can	  be	  little	  doubt	  that	  Sosa	  is	  correct.	  Plausibly,	  there	  is	  yet	  another	  way	  in	  which	  intuitions	  are	  rationally	  evaluable,	  beyond	  the	  question	  of	  how	  much	  the	  intuition	  that	  p	  ought	  to	  attract	  assent	  that	  
p.	  Perhaps	  there	  is	  also	  room	  to	  evaluate	  the	  intuition	  itself.	  We	  will	  see	  below	  that	  Sosa	  is	  committed	  to	  such	  evaluability.	  Well-­‐functioning,	  virtuous	  epistemic	  agents	  are	  attracted	  to	  a	  certain	  class	  of	  truths;	  such	  attractions	  are	  a	  credit	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ibid.	  p.	  55.	  7	  Sosa	  (2007b),	  p.	  51.	  For	  subjects	  to	  ‘track’	  a	  proposition	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  is	  approximately	  for	  their	  beliefs	  to	  be	  counterfactually	  sensitive	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  that	  proposition;	  if	  a	  subject’s	  belief	  tracks	  the	  fact	  that	  p,	  then,	  were	  p	  not	  the	  case,	  the	  subject	  would	  not	  believe	  that	  p.	  See	  e.g.	  Nozick	  (1981),	  p.	  185.	  
	   http://jonathanichikawa.net/papers/vipm.pdf	  
vipm	   4	   ichikawa	  
their	  subjects.	  Almost	  everyone	  finds	  it	  intuitive	  that	  4	  >	  3;	  if	  someone	  had	  an	  intuitive	  repulsion	  from	  this	  truth,	  instead	  of	  the	  usual	  attraction,	  this	  would	  reflect	  badly	  on	  him	  as	  an	  epistemic	  agent,	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  arithmetic.	  The	  point	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  such	  simple	  contents;	  if	  someone	  has	  studied	  logic	  and	  finds	  DeMorgan’s	  Laws	  intuitive,	  then	  she	  is,	  epistemically	  speaking,	  with	  respect	  to	  logic,	  better	  off	  than	  her	  peers	  who	  have	  no	  particular	  attraction	  to	  assent,	  and	  better	  off	  still	  than	  those	  who	  find	  the	  equivalence	  counterintuitive.	  The	  phenomenon	  in	  question	  is	  a	  general	  one,	  extending	  well	  beyond	  philosophical	  questions.	  Expert	  poker	  players	  make	  much	  more	  reliable	  intuitive	  poker	  judgments	  than	  do	  novices;	  this	  even	  though,	  in	  some	  cases,	  they	  are	  unable,	  without	  confabulation,	  to	  articulate	  the	  considerations	  that	  led	  them	  to	  their	  judgments.	  Professional	  outfielders	  make	  excellent	  immediate	  judgments	  as	  to	  which	  direction	  to	  run	  in	  order	  to	  catch	  the	  ball,	  but	  few	  could	  tell	  you	  how	  they	  know.	  (McBeath	  et	  al	  (1995)	  argues	  that	  the	  best	  available	  data	  indicates	  that	  fielders,	  while	  running,	  seek	  to	  maintain	  a	  linear	  optical	  trajectory	  with	  monotonic	  increases	  in	  optical	  ball	  height.)	  We	  are	  all,	  in	  our	  small	  ways,	  Ramanujans.	  But	  does	  this	  represent	  a	  disanaology	  with	  perceptual	  experience?	  One	  might	  think	  that,	  just	  as	  there	  is	  room	  to	  evaluate	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  one	  is	  attracted	  by	  intuition	  to	  assent	  to	  a	  given	  proposition,	  so	  is	  there	  room	  to	  evaluate	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  one	  is	  attracted	  by	  perceptual	  experience	  to	  a	  given	  proposition.	  Indeed,	  on	  one	  natural	  reading,	  the	  central	  epistemic	  tradition	  of	  engagement	  with	  skepticism	  is	  a	  dialectic	  with	  regards	  to	  this	  question:	  to	  what	  degree	  ought	  my	  perceptual	  experience	  attract	  me	  to	  assent	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  I	  have	  hands?	  However,	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  neglects	  Sosa’s	  particular	  ontological	  approach	  to	  intuitions.	  Intuitions,	  for	  Sosa,	  are	  not	  experiences	  that	  lead	  us	  to	  develop	  attractions	  to	  assent;	  they	  are	  the	  attractions	  themselves.	  Experiences,	  by	  contrast,	  are,	  in	  Sosa’s	  framework,	  passive	  and	  non-­‐rational.	  (Sosa	  here	  commits	  to	  a	  certain	  approach	  to	  nonconceptual	  content:	  they	  are	  non-­‐rational	  precisely	  because	  they	  do	  not	  involve	  concept	  application.)	  This	  is	  why	  Sosa	  argues	  that	  experience	  is	  not	  rationally	  evaluable	  in	  the	  way	  that	  intuition	  is.	  Since	  the	  argument	  here	  relies	  on	  his	  particular	  identification	  of	  intuitions	  with	  attractions	  to	  assent,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  it	  leaves	  open	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  ‘intuitive	  experience’	  that	  plays	  a	  role	  parallel	  to	  perceptual	  experience	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  a	  priori.	  Sosa	  clearly	  thinks	  there	  is	  no	  such	  experience—and	  perhaps	  he	  is	  right	  to	  think	  not—but	  the	  argument	  here	  only	  establishes	  that	  intuitions,	  as	  he	  understands	  them,	  are	  not	  such	  experiences.	  This	  last	  point	  relates	  rather	  directly	  to	  Sosa’s	  second	  disanalogy	  between	  intuition	  and	  perceptual	  experience,	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  an	  intermediate	  state	  standing	  between	  fact	  and	  judgment.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  how	  to	  go	  about	  evaluating	  whether	  it	  is	  correct.	  Sosa	  thinks	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  perception	  we	  do	  have	  an	  intermediating	  state	  playing	  such	  a	  role,	  but	  that	  in	  the	  cases	  of	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introspection	  and	  intuition,	  we	  do	  not.	  In	  the	  introspective	  case,	  Sosa	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  the	  introspected	  fact	  itself	  that	  directly	  justifies	  the	  introspective	  judgment.	  We	  will	  see	  below	  that	  he	  prefers	  a	  different	  story	  about	  intuition,	  but	  he	  agrees	  that	  it	  is	  no	  intermediate	  mental	  experience	  between	  fact	  and	  belief.	  I	  do	  not	  see	  in	  Sosa	  any	  straightforward	  argument	  to	  this	  effect;	  it	  is	  just	  a	  claim	  made	  at	  various	  points	  as	  if	  he	  considers	  it	  obvious.	  But	  introspective	  access	  to	  claims	  such	  as	  these	  is	  a	  tricky	  business.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting,	  for	  instance,	  that	  some	  philosophers	  have	  denied	  that	  the	  state	  of	  sensory	  experience	  plays	  such	  a	  mediating	  role	  in	  the	  case	  of	  perception;	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  tell,	  short	  of	  constructing	  and	  selecting	  between	  the	  relevant	  theories,	  whether	  this	  is	  so.	  Likewise,	  I	  see	  no	  obvious	  reason	  to	  reject	  the	  suggestion	  that	  introspective	  judgments,	  as	  of	  headaches,	  proceed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  intermediary	  experience,	  one	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  seeming	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  headache.	  So	  as	  far	  as	  this	  point	  goes,	  I	  don’t	  see	  that	  Sosa	  has	  established,	  so	  much	  as	  claimed,	  that	  intuition	  is	  unlike	  perception	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  role	  of	  an	  intermediary	  state.	  	  Sosa’s	  third	  argument,	  though,	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  more	  traction	  against	  the	  perceptual	  model	  of	  intuition:	  the	  causal	  connection	  between	  fact	  and	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  obviously	  not	  applicable	  in	  the	  case	  of	  intuition.	  This	  does	  seem	  a	  plausible	  candidate	  for	  an	  essential	  feature	  of	  a	  perceptual	  model.	  We	  may	  add	  one	  more	  reason	  not	  to	  prefer	  a	  perceptual	  model	  of	  intuition:	  it	  fails	  to	  respect	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  constraints	  of	  rationality	  are	  objective.	  According	  to	  the	  perceptual	  model	  of	  intuition,	  intuitions	  play	  a	  justifying	  role	  analogous	  to	  that	  enjoyed	  by	  sensory	  experience.	  But	  there	  is	  an	  intuitive	  disanalogy	  concerning	  the	  rationality	  of	  intuitive	  and	  perceptual	  judgments:	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  former,	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  judgments	  in	  question	  seems	  contingent	  on	  having	  the	  particular	  experiences	  that	  allegedly	  underwrite	  it.	  I	  would	  suffer	  no	  rational	  pressure	  to	  form	  a	  perceptual	  belief,	  absent	  the	  sensory	  experience	  in	  question;	  someone	  who	  is	  blind,	  or	  in	  a	  totally	  dark	  room,	  faces	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  walls	  are	  red.	  By	  contrast,	  someone	  who,	  upon	  considering	  the	  proposition	  that	  2	  +	  2	  =	  4,	  does	  not	  undergo	  any	  intuitive	  experience	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  is	  true,	  thereby	  demonstrates	  a	  rational	  deficiency—a	  deviation	  from	  ideal	  rationality.	  She,	  unlike	  her	  blind	  counterpart,	  does	  suffer	  rational	  pressure	  to	  believe	  that	  content,	  even	  if	  her	  intuitions	  are	  not	  helping	  her	  to	  appreciate	  it.	  
1.3.	  Factive	  models	  As	  Sosa	  sees	  it,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  perceptual	  model	  of	  intuition	  prima	  facie	  motivates	  a	  Cartesian,	  factive	  model	  of	  intuitions	  that	  emphasizes	  a	  similarity	  between	  intuition	  and	  introspection.	  Sosa	  writes:	  In	  explaining	  what	  it	  is	  to	  perceive	  clearly	  and	  distinctly,	  Descartes	  does	  not	  turn	  simply	  to	  logic,	  or	  arithmetic,	  or	  geometry.	  In	  his	  most	  prominent	  explanation	  of	  the	  notion,	  he	  appeals	  rather	  to	  introspection.	  Even	  if	  our	  awareness	  that	  we	  suffer	  a	  pain	  has	  some	  clarity	  in	  it,	  we	  fall	  short	  of	  clear	  
and	  distinct	  perception	  until	  we	  separate	  the	  hypothesis	  as	  to	  the	  origin	  of	  our	  feeling	  of	  pain	  from	  the	  perception	  that	  we	  have	  that	  feeling.	  It	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  feeling,	  so	  detached,	  that	  attains	  both	  clarity	  and	  
	   http://jonathanichikawa.net/papers/vipm.pdf	  
vipm	   6	   ichikawa	  
distinctness.	  So,	  Descartes’	  model	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  intuitive	  justification	  and	  knowledge	  is	  introspection,	  not	  perception.	  …	  According	  to	  this	  model,	  a	  propositional	  content	  about	  a	  present	  state	  of	  consciousness	  can	  attract	  assent	  through	  its	  sheer	  truth	  (though	  presumably	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  simple	  enough	  as	  well).	  Analogously,	  what	  properly	  draws	  your	  assent	  to	  propositional	  contents	  about	  simple	  arithmetic,	  geometry,	  and	  logic,	  is	  again	  their	  truth.	  And	  the	  corresponding	  belief	  may	  then	  be	  said,	  by	  extension,	  to	  be	  intuitively	  and	  even	  foundationally	  justified.	  One	  is	  justified	  intuitively	  by	  grasping	  a	  fact	  directly.8	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  it	  obvious	  that	  introspection	  works	  the	  way	  here	  supposed.	  Given	  the	  possibility	  of	  errors	  in	  introspective	  judgment,	  I	  see	  no	  obvious	  objection	  to	  the	  suggestion	  that	  introspection	  of	  a	  headache	  involves	  sensitivity	  to	  an	  intermediate	  quasi-­‐perceptual	  state	  that	  is,	  in	  typical	  instances,	  caused	  by	  the	  headache	  itself.	  It	  is	  also	  not	  obvious	  to	  me	  that	  there	  is	  such	  an	  intermediate	  state,	  so	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  here	  exactly	  to	  be	  objecting	  to	  Sosa	  (or	  Descartes,	  according	  to	  Sosa’s	  reading);	  I	  mean	  only	  to	  highlight	  the	  assumption	  as	  a	  substantive	  one,	  both	  to	  clarify	  the	  suggestion,	  and	  to	  point	  to	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  dissenter	  to	  object.	  For	  now,	  let	  us	  follow	  Sosa	  in	  supposing	  that	  introspection	  is	  direct;	  our	  introspective	  beliefs	  proceed	  by	  direct	  appreciation	  of	  internal	  facts.	  Can	  the	  same	  be	  said	  about	  intuition?	  One	  immediate	  worry	  carries	  over	  rather	  directly	  from	  the	  worries	  for	  the	  perceptual	  model:	  since	  logical,	  arithmetical,	  and	  philosophical	  facts	  do	  not	  in	  general	  enter	  into	  causal	  relations	  with	  human	  beings,	  their	  truth	  cannot	  in	  any	  literal	  sense	  ‘draw	  your	  assent,’	  since	  drawing	  is	  a	  causal	  notion.	  Perhaps	  the	  occurrent	  consideration	  of	  such	  truths	  draws	  assent,	  but	  this	  still	  seems	  a	  significant	  disanalogy	  with	  introspection,	  just	  as	  it	  is	  with	  perception.	  (In	  the	  latter	  cases,	  we	  don’t	  think	  that	  consideration	  of	  introspected	  or	  perceived	  facts	  causes	  attraction	  to	  assent;	  we	  think	  the	  facts	  themselves	  do.)	  Headaches	  cause	  judgments	  of	  headaches;	  modal	  facts	  don’t	  cause	  anything.	  Sosa	  does	  not,	  so	  far	  as	  I	  can	  tell,	  consider	  this	  particular	  worry	  for	  the	  introspective	  model	  of	  intuition.9	  Dialectically,	  from	  his	  point	  of	  view,	  this	  omission	  is	  perhaps	  permissible,	  as	  he	  tends	  to	  develop	  a	  different	  objection	  to	  the	  introspective	  model—namely,	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  intuited	  judgments	  cannot	  directly	  draw	  assent,	  because	  there	  are	  false	  intuitions	  that	  justify	  in	  just	  the	  same	  way	  as	  true	  ones	  do.	  Sosa’s	  favorite	  examples	  here	  concern	  paradoxes:	  cases	  in	  which	  each	  of	  several	  propositions	  is	  intuitively	  justified,	  but	  where	  philosophical	  investigation	  demonstrates	  that	  they	  cannot	  possibly	  all	  be	  right.	  Consider	  for	  example,	  a	  formulation	  of	  a	  sorites	  paradox:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Sosa	  (2007a)	  pp.	  56-­‐57.	  9	  The	  central	  places	  in	  which	  Sosa	  considers	  views	  of	  this	  sort	  are	  his	  (2007a)	  pp.	  56-­‐60	  and	  (2007b).	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1.	   A	  man	  with	  no	  hairs	  on	  his	  head	  is	  bald.	  2.	   For	  all	  n,	  if	  a	  man	  with	  exactly	  n	  hairs	  on	  his	  head	  is	  bald,	  then	  a	  man	  with	  exactly	  n+1	  hairs	  on	  his	  head	  is	  bald.	  3.	   A	  man	  with	  that	  much	  hair	  on	  his	  head	  [here	  indicating	  Ernest	  Sosa]	  is	  not	  bald.10	  According	  to	  the	  standard	  treatment	  of	  the	  paradox,	  each	  premise	  is	  intuitively	  plausible,	  but	  philosophical	  investigation—in	  this	  case,	  a	  bit	  of	  relatively	  trivial	  reasoning—reveals	  that	  at	  least	  one	  must	  be	  false.	  But	  prior	  to	  this	  investigation,	  the	  naïve	  theorist	  is,	  Sosa	  suggests,	  justified	  in	  each	  premise,	  and	  justified	  intuitively.	  Since	  we	  know	  that	  at	  least	  one	  premise	  is	  false,	  it	  cannot	  be	  that	  in	  general,	  the	  truth	  of	  an	  intuitive	  claim	  accounts	  for	  its	  justificatory	  status.	  We	  will	  consider	  an	  objection	  to	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  in	  §1.5	  below.	  For	  now,	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  positive	  view	  Sosa	  takes	  this	  failure	  to	  motivate.	  
1.4.	  Competence	  models	  Sosa’s	  own	  favored	  view	  of	  the	  role	  of	  intuition	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  a	  
priori	  is	  a	  particular	  application	  of	  virtue	  epistemology.	  (It	  is	  not,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  only	  way	  to	  apply	  virtue	  epistemology	  to	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  a	  priori.)	  In	  general,	  a	  virtue-­‐theoretic	  approach	  to	  epistemology	  associates	  epistemic	  justification	  with	  virtuous	  epistemic	  performance.	  Agents	  may	  have	  better	  or	  worse	  epistemic	  dispositions.	  An	  epistemically	  good	  disposition	  is	  an	  epistemic	  virtue;	  an	  epistemically	  bad	  disposition	  is	  an	  epistemic	  vice.	  Sosa’s	  brand	  of	  virtue	  epistemology	  ties	  virtue	  closely	  to	  reliability:	  an	  epistemic	  virtue	  (as	  he	  often	  puts	  it:	  a	  competence)	  is	  a	  disposition	  to	  form	  judgments	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reliably	  yields	  true	  belief	  and	  avoids	  false	  belief.	  Dispositions	  do	  not	  always	  manifest;	  one	  can	  be	  generally	  disposed	  to	  judge	  well,	  and	  yet	  judge	  poorly	  in	  an	  instance—such	  would	  be	  a	  generally	  virtuous	  agent	  acting	  viciously	  in	  the	  moment.	  Of	  course,	  even	  the	  exercise	  of	  virtue	  does	  not	  guarantee	  truth;	  one	  may	  judge	  reliably	  and	  yet	  go	  wrong	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  one’s	  own.	  Such	  is	  the	  plight	  of	  subjects	  with	  beliefs	  that	  are	  justified	  but	  false.	  One	  may	  even	  judge	  virtuously	  and	  come	  to	  believe	  a	  truth,	  where	  so	  correctly	  believing	  nevertheless	  fails	  to	  manifest	  virtue—the	  belief	  was	  only	  luckily	  true.	  Such,	  Sosa	  thinks,	  is	  the	  proper	  diagnosis	  of	  Gettier	  cases.	  Sosa	  has	  often	  made	  use	  of	  an	  analogy	  to	  an	  archer;11	  we	  may	  find	  it	  useful	  as	  well.	  An	  archer	  may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  skilled—her	  skill	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  approximately	  a	  propensity	  to	  hit	  the	  target	  (and	  avoid	  missing	  it).	  Being	  a	  good	  archer	  in	  general	  is	  analogous	  to	  being	  epistemically	  virtuous	  in	  general.	  A	  good	  archer	  will	  tend	  to	  release	  adroit	  shots—these	  are	  shots	  that	  manifest	  the	  archer’s	  skill;	  they	  are	  well-­‐aimed,	  etc.	  An	  adroit	  shot	  corresponds	  to	  a	  justified	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  We	  may	  interpret	  (3)	  as	  a	  de	  re	  judgment	  about	  the	  amount	  of	  hair	  that	  Ernest	  Sosa	  has;	  thus	  do	  we	  make	  plausible	  that	  the	  justification	  here	  is	  intuitive.	  The	  judgment	  that	  Ernest	  Sosa	  is	  not	  bald	  is	  plausibly	  a	  perceptual	  one.	  11	  E.g.	  Sosa	  (2007a)	  pp.	  22-­‐23.	  
	   http://jonathanichikawa.net/papers/vipm.pdf	  
vipm	   8	   ichikawa	  
belief.	  A	  successful	  shot	  hits	  the	  target—as	  a	  successful	  belief	  ‘hits’	  the	  truth.	  An	  adroit	  shot	  is	  more	  likely	  than	  a	  bad	  one	  to	  be	  successful,	  but	  sometimes	  adroit	  shots	  miss	  (as	  when	  a	  gust	  of	  wind	  intervenes)	  and	  sometimes	  bad	  shots	  hit	  (when	  they	  are	  lucky).	  Likewise,	  an	  adroit	  shot	  may	  succeed	  only	  luckily,	  as	  when	  a	  gust	  of	  wind	  sends	  it	  off	  course,	  and	  another	  lucky	  one	  directs	  it	  again	  to	  the	  target;	  such	  are	  the	  Gettier	  cases	  of	  marksmanship.	  So	  stated,	  the	  generalized	  version	  of	  Sosa’s	  virtue	  epistemology	  relates	  justification	  and	  knowledge	  to	  judgment,	  and	  its	  connection	  to	  virtuous—viz.,	  reliable—dispositions	  to	  judge.	  How	  do	  intuitions	  fit	  into	  the	  picture?	  Sosa	  treats	  them	  very	  much	  like	  judgments:	  as	  justified	  or	  unjustified,	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  are	  the	  result	  of	  an	  epistemic	  competence.	  …[T]he	  intuitions	  immediately	  delivered	  by	  our	  rational	  competences	  are	  preponderantly	  true,	  even	  if	  occasionally	  false.	  This	  is	  why	  those	  rational	  mechanisms	  are	  intellectual	  competences,	  because	  they	  systematically	  lead	  us	  aright.	  All	  seemings	  delivered	  by	  such	  competences	  are	  thereby	  epistemically	  justified.12	  So	  intuitions,	  like	  judgments	  generally,	  can	  be	  good	  or	  bad;	  like	  judgments	  generally,	  they	  are	  good	  when	  they	  are	  produced	  by	  competences—i.e.,	  when	  they	  are	  produced	  by	  reliable	  mechanisms—and	  bad	  otherwise.	  Thus,	  according	  to	  Sosa,	  can	  mistaken	  intuitions	  justify,	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  paradoxes.	  Although	  they	  are	  false	  intuitions,	  having	  gone	  wrong	  in	  the	  cases	  in	  question,	  they	  are	  nevertheless	  produced	  by	  competences,	  which	  typically	  produce	  true	  intuitions.	  Of	  course,	  as	  epistemologists,	  we	  are	  not	  only,	  or	  even	  primarily,	  interested	  in	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  intuitions	  are	  justified.	  Indeed,	  we	  rarely	  use	  the	  language	  of	  justification	  and	  unjustification	  for	  intuitions	  at	  all.	  Instead,	  or	  at	  least	  in	  addition,	  we	  want	  to	  know	  about	  the	  justification	  conditions	  for	  intuitive	  
belief.	  What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  justified	  intuition	  and	  justified	  belief?	  
Prima	  facie,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  there	  should	  be	  any	  straightforward	  relationship	  here.	  Intuitions	  are	  attractions	  to	  believe;	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  intuitive	  beliefs	  are	  only	  virtuous	  when	  based	  on	  intuitions	  that	  are	  themselves	  virtuous.	  Compare	  the	  various	  attractions	  one	  might	  have	  to	  shoot	  arrows—thinking	  it’d	  be	  fun,	  having	  energy	  to	  spare,	  hoping	  for	  some	  game	  to	  eat,	  trying	  to	  impress	  a	  lover—none	  of	  these	  have	  any	  straightforward	  bearing	  on	  whether	  the	  resultant	  shot	  is	  an	  adroit	  one.	  One	  can	  shoot	  well,	  even	  having	  been	  attracted	  by	  a	  bad	  reason.	  Sosa,	  however,	  sees	  a	  tighter	  connection	  here,	  writing,	  for	  instance,	  that	  if	  an	  intuition	  is	  epistemically	  faulty	  (i.e.,	  not	  produced	  by	  a	  competence—produced,	  perhaps,	  by	  vicious	  enculturation),	  then	  “it	  could	  hardly	  provide	  epistemic	  justification	  to	  any	  belief	  founded	  upon	  it.	  Only	  competently	  derived	  intuitive	  seemings	  could	  do	  so.”13	  What	  could	  justify	  such	  a	  stance?	  Sosa’s	  remark	  here	  would	  be	  vindicated	  if	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  only	  a	  belief	  founded	  upon	  a	  virtuous	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Sosa	  (2007a)	  p.	  60.	  13	  Sosa	  (2007a)	  p.	  62.	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intuition	  could	  itself	  be	  virtuous.	  Whether	  this	  is	  so	  turns	  upon	  questions	  about	  how	  to	  individuate	  belief-­‐forming	  dispositions.	  The	  question	  is	  a	  version	  of	  the	  generality	  problem	  for	  process	  reliabilism.14	  Suppose	  someone	  has	  the	  intuition	  that	  p,	  and	  on	  this	  basis,	  forms	  the	  belief	  that	  p.	  Is	  her	  resultant	  belief	  justified?	  In	  particular,	  we	  wonder	  whether	  the	  justification	  of	  her	  belief	  rests	  in	  important	  part	  on	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  relevant	  intuition.	  Suppose	  we	  considered	  her	  to	  be	  employing	  a	  disposition	  to	  believe	  everything	  she	  finds	  intuitive,	  and	  to	  suspend	  judgment	  on	  everything	  she	  finds	  neither	  intuitive,	  nor	  counterintuitive,	  if	  no	  other	  evidence	  presents	  itself.	  By	  stipulation,	  she	  believes	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  virtue	  of	  the	  intuition;	  nevertheless,	  plausibly,	  her	  preponderance	  of	  true	  intuitions	  to	  false	  ones	  will	  be	  high,	  and	  so	  her	  belief-­‐forming	  dispositions	  will	  be	  at	  least	  reasonably	  virtuous.	  If	  this	  is	  how	  we	  think	  of	  her	  competence,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  requirement	  that	  intuitions	  be	  themselves	  well-­‐founded	  in	  order	  to	  justify.	  Of	  course,	  someone	  with	  the	  dispositions	  just	  described	  will	  be	  far	  from	  ideally	  virtuous;	  a	  more	  reliable	  tendency	  would	  involve	  the	  exercise	  of	  due	  diligence	  to	  ensure	  that	  beliefs	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  only	  those	  intuitions	  that	  are	  well-­‐founded.	  While	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  people	  in	  general	  to	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  all	  of	  their	  good	  intuitions	  from	  all	  of	  their	  bad	  ones,	  it	  is	  very	  plausible	  that	  steps	  can	  be	  made	  to	  improve	  reliability	  here:	  we	  can	  trust	  our	  intuitions	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  when	  in	  more	  favorable	  circumstances	  for	  thinking	  clearly,	  and	  we	  can	  be	  particularly	  cautious	  with	  the	  sorts	  of	  intuitions	  that	  could	  easily	  be	  the	  product	  of	  irresponsible	  bias.	  So	  perhaps	  Sosa’s	  thought	  here	  is	  that	  to	  be	  reliable	  enough	  to	  constitute	  virtuous	  performance,	  subjects	  must	  exhibit	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  virtue	  of	  the	  intuitions	  in	  question.	  This	  is	  plausible	  enough,	  but	  it	  still	  does	  not	  yield	  the	  strong	  connection	  between	  good	  intuition	  and	  good	  belief	  suggested.	  Perhaps	  good	  belief	  demands	  that	  one	  exhibit	  some	  selectivity	  about	  one’s	  intuitions;	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  selection	  in	  question	  must	  be	  infallible.	  Suppose	  an	  intuition	  is	  unjustified—it	  is	  formed	  via	  an	  unreliable	  process,	  rather	  than	  by	  a	  competence—but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  defies	  detection	  as	  such	  by	  the	  usual	  sorts	  of	  introspective	  processes	  by	  which	  a	  subject	  recognizes	  many	  untrustworthy	  intuitions.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  a	  subject	  might	  exhibit	  belief-­‐forming	  competence	  by	  treating	  the	  intuition	  critically,	  then	  going	  on	  virtuously	  to	  base	  judgment	  on	  what	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  unvirtuous	  intuition.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  what,	  on	  Sosa’s	  view,	  could	  prevent	  a	  subject	  from	  coming	  to	  justified	  belief	  in	  this	  way.	  So	  we	  see	  a	  tension	  between	  elements	  of	  Sosa’s	  approach	  to	  intuitions.	  He	  wants,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  render	  intuitions	  epistemically	  evaluable,	  in	  a	  way	  closely	  analogous	  to	  beliefs,	  and	  to	  judge	  them	  as	  justified	  or	  not	  via	  his	  virtue-­‐theoretic	  framework;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  is	  careful	  to	  emphasize	  that	  intuitions	  are	  not	  themselves	  judgments	  but	  merely	  attractions	  to	  judge.	  By	  thus	  separating	  intuition	  and	  judgment,	  it	  becomes	  possible,	  on	  the	  virtue	  framework,	  to	  evaluate	  them	  independently,	  even	  in	  the	  case	  when	  a	  judgment	  rests	  on	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  For	  an	  overview,	  see	  Conee	  &	  Feldman	  (1998).	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intuition.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  way	  to	  derive	  another	  result	  Sosa	  claims:	  that	  intuitive	  belief	  is	  justified	  only	  if	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  justified	  intuition.	  
1.5.	  Mistaken	  intuitions	  justifying	  Although	  Sosa	  wants	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  unjustified	  intuitions	  justifying	  belief,	  he	  does	  allow	  for	  false	  intuitions	  to	  justify	  belief.	  So	  he	  commits	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  false	  justified	  intuitions—again,	  false	  premises	  in	  paradoxes	  provide	  the	  paradigms.	  As	  he	  observes,	  however,	  there	  could	  be	  reason	  to	  doubt	  that	  false	  intuitions	  could	  justify	  in	  this	  way.	  Here	  is	  a	  line	  of	  thought	  that	  Sosa	  attributes	  to	  Descartes:	  Suppose	  that,	  apart	  from	  having	  drawn	  it	  as	  a	  deductive	  conclusion,	  someone	  has	  no	  reason	  whatsoever	  for	  believing	  a	  certain	  proposition,	  one	  that	  can	  be	  known	  not	  directly	  but	  only	  through	  reasoning.	  If	  the	  reasoning	  is	  grossly	  fallacious,	  it	  cannot	  really	  justify	  the	  subject	  in	  believing	  that	  conclusion.	  When	  we	  work	  our	  way	  back	  through	  the	  reasoning	  we	  eventually	  hit	  the	  fallacy;	  let	  it	  be	  an	  affirming	  of	  the	  consequent.	  At	  that	  point	  it	  must	  have	  seemed	  intuitive	  to	  the	  reasoner	  to	  think	  something	  of	  the	  following	  form:	  
that,	  necessarily,	  if	  q,	  and	  p	  	  q,	  then	  p.	  In	  making	  that	  immediate	  inference,	  the	  thinker	  makes	  manifest	  his	  intuitive	  attraction	  to	  its	  corresponding	  conditional.	  But	  he	  cannot	  really	  be	  justified	  in	  being	  thus	  attracted	  to	  that	  conditional,	  nor	  in	  any	  corresponding	  belief.	  Whatever	  sort	  of	  epistemic	  justification	  he	  lacks	  for	  assenting	  to	  the	  conclusion	  is	  one	  he	  must	  also	  lack	  for	  attraction	  and	  assent	  to	  that	  unfortunate	  conditional.	  This	  reveals	  an	  advantage	  of	  the	  Cartesian	  [factive]	  account	  of	  intuition:	  that	  it	  explains	  our	  verdict	  about	  the	  fallacious	  intuition.	  Descartes	  suggests	  that	  the	  intuition	  at	  work	  in	  the	  fallacy	  is	  apparent	  intuition	  (merely	  apparent	  intuition),	  whereas	  only	  real	  intuition	  justifies.	  For	  him,	  all	  real	  intuition	  must	  be	  true,	  so	  the	  corresponding	  conditional	  of	  affirming	  the	  consequent	  cannot	  really	  be	  intuited.	  What	  is	  not	  a	  fact,	  on	  his	  view,	  is	  just	  not	  there	  to	  be	  intuited.15	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Sosa	  is	  committed	  to	  resisting	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  since	  it	  is	  his	  view	  that	  at	  least	  sometimes,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  paradoxes,	  subjects	  have	  justified	  intuitive	  beliefs	  that	  are	  false.	  And	  since	  Sosa	  says	  that	  only	  virtuous	  intuitions	  can	  justify,	  he	  thereby	  commits	  to	  false	  virtuous	  intuitions	  with	  these	  contents	  as	  well.	  What,	  then,	  distinguishes	  justified	  false	  intuitions,	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  paradoxes,	  from	  unjustified	  ones,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  intuition	  that	  would	  license	  affirming	  the	  consequent?	  It	  cannot	  be	  merely	  that	  the	  latter	  constitutes	  fallacious	  reasoning,	  for	  false	  premises	  in	  paradox	  would	  license	  fallacious	  reasoning	  just	  as	  much	  as	  the	  affirming-­‐the-­‐consequent	  intuition	  would.	  (For	  example,	  supposing	  the	  iterative	  principle	  to	  be	  the	  false	  premise	  in	  the	  sorites	  paradoxes,	  it	  seems	  to	  license	  fallacious	  reasoning	  from	  the	  baldness	  of	  Stephen	  Stich	  to	  the	  baldness	  of	  Ernest	  Sosa.)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Sosa	  (2007a)	  p.	  58.	  See	  Sosa	  (2007b)	  pp.	  53-­‐54,	  for	  effectively	  the	  same	  point,	  developed	  a	  bit	  more	  thoroughly.	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Sosa’s	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  key	  difference	  turns	  on	  whether	  the	  false	  intuition	  derives	  from	  “some	  avoidably	  defective	  way”;	  such	  errors	  constitute	  “faults,	  individual	  flaws,	  or	  defects.”16	  Sosa	  thinks	  this	  is	  what	  is	  going	  on	  when	  somebody	  follows	  her	  strong	  inclination	  to	  affirm	  the	  consequent,	  inferring	  from	  q	  and	  (if	  p,	  q)	  to	  p.	  By	  contrast,	  “the	  false	  intuitions	  involved	  in	  deep	  paradoxes	  are	  not	  so	  clearly	  faults,	  individual	  flaws,	  or	  defects.	  For	  example,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  they	  derive	  from	  our	  basic	  make-­‐up,	  shared	  among	  humans	  generally,	  a	  make-­‐up	  that	  serves	  us	  well	  in	  an	  environment	  such	  as	  ours	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  our	  planet.”	  So	  Sosa’s	  line	  is	  that	  false	  intuitions	  do	  not	  justify	  when	  they	  derive	  from	  faults,	  flaws,	  and	  defects,	  but	  do	  justify	  when	  they	  derive	  from	  our	  basic	  make-­‐up	  and	  are	  generally	  shared	  among	  humans.	  But	  does	  the	  distinction	  hold	  up	  to	  scrutiny?	  In	  a	  sense,	  of	  course,	  one	  illustrates	  a	  flaw	  or	  defect	  by	  virtue	  of	  falling	  short	  of	  the	  highest	  ideals	  of	  rationality;	  this,	  of	  course,	  cannot	  be	  what	  Sosa	  here	  has	  in	  mind.	  Instead,	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  imagining	  flaws	  as	  deviations	  from	  some	  sort	  of	  imperfect	  but	  generally	  effective	  strategy	  for	  getting	  around	  in	  the	  world.	  This	  is,	  perhaps,	  the	  more	  ordinary	  sense	  of	  a	  defect.	  My	  computer,	  even	  when	  it	  is	  working	  properly,	  will	  occasionally	  crash;	  a	  tendency	  to	  crash	  constitutes	  a	  defect	  only	  when	  it	  is	  not	  working	  properly.	  And	  maybe	  there	  is	  a	  good	  reason	  why	  humans	  ought	  to	  have	  tendencies	  to	  accept,	  for	  instance,	  naive	  set	  theory,	  or	  threshold	  principles	  for	  vague	  predicates.	  But	  does	  this	  distinguish	  paradoxical	  premises,	  which	  Sosa	  thinks	  will	  involve	  justified	  intuitions,	  from	  the	  kinds	  of	  fallacious	  moves	  he	  is	  concerned	  to	  rule	  out?	  The	  problem	  for	  this	  line	  is	  that	  there	  is	  also	  plausibly	  sound	  reason	  for	  humans	  to	  have	  tendencies	  to	  commit	  such	  errors	  as	  affirming	  the	  consequent.	  Given	  the	  environments	  we	  face,	  having	  a	  tendency	  to	  affirm	  the	  consequent	  will	  help	  us	  to	  recognize	  patterns	  and	  confirm	  hypotheses;	  inductive	  reasoning	  generally	  looks	  a	  bit	  like	  affirming	  the	  consequent.	  	  This	  sort	  of	  pattern	  is	  less	  exception	  than	  rule.	  A	  great	  many	  well-­‐documented	  human	  rational	  errors	  derive	  from	  the	  application	  of	  generally	  reliable	  heuristics;	  such	  heuristics	  are,	  in	  typical	  cases,	  deeply	  engrained	  in	  human	  psychology,	  and	  present	  in	  humans	  generally—even	  experts	  who	  ought	  obviously	  to	  know	  better.17	  So	  we	  face	  a	  dilemma	  for	  upholding	  Sosa’s	  distinction.	  Do	  we	  say	  that	  these	  errors—these	  false	  judgments	  arising	  from	  generally	  good	  heuristics—constitute	  defects	  or	  not?	  If	  not,	  then	  they	  are	  relevantly	  like	  Sosa	  thinks	  the	  intuitive	  premises	  involved	  in	  deep	  paradoxes	  are.	  If	  so,	  what	  makes	  them	  so,	  and	  why	  should	  they	  not	  apply	  also	  to	  the	  cases	  of	  the	  paradoxes?	  The	  ordinary	  reasoner—your	  average	  philosopher,	  say—looks	  down	  on	  the	  fallacious	  reasoner	  Sosa	  describes,	  and	  identifies	  his	  intuition	  as	  the	  vicious	  result	  of	  carelessness.	  But	  imagine	  the	  perspective	  of	  an	  extraordinary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Sosa	  (2007b),	  p.	  54.	  17	  For	  a	  useful	  overview,	  see	  Tversky	  &	  Kahneman	  (1974),	  especially	  pp.	  1124	  (for	  the	  connection	  to	  generally	  reliable	  heuristics)	  and	  1130	  (for	  the	  prevalence	  of	  these	  rational	  errors	  even	  among	  experts).	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reasoner—an	  über-­‐rational	  being	  who	  rates	  much	  higher	  on	  the	  scales	  of	  rationality.	  Her	  attitude	  toward	  the	  ordinary	  reasoner	  is	  much	  the	  same	  as	  his	  attitude	  toward	  the	  fallacious	  reasoner.	  She	  describes	  both	  as	  defective—as	  failing	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  rationality.	  Although	  she	  can	  see	  that	  the	  ordinary	  reasoner	  is	  not	  tempted	  by	  one	  particular	  error—affirming	  the	  consequent—she	  points	  to	  another	  error	  that	  he	  regularly	  makes—some	  complicated	  fallacy	  that	  we	  ordinary	  reasoners	  do	  not	  recognize	  as	  such—and	  that	  he	  also	  has	  some	  attraction	  to	  more	  fallacies—the	  necessarily	  false	  premises	  of	  paradoxes.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  it	  appears	  difficult	  to	  justify	  Sosa’s	  attitude	  that	  the	  error	  of	  the	  ordinary	  reasoner	  is	  importantly	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  fallacious	  reasoner;	  the	  ordinary	  reasoner	  is	  fallacious	  himself	  in	  his	  own	  way.	  The	  fallacious	  reasoner	  demonstrates	  epistemic	  defects.	  This,	  even	  though	  there	  is	  typically	  a	  psychological	  story	  to	  be	  told	  about	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  defective	  judgments	  in	  which	  they	  arise	  from	  generally	  reliable	  dispositions.	  According	  to	  Sosa,	  the	  ordinary	  errors—like	  accepting	  the	  premises	  of	  paradoxes—are	  fundamentally	  different.	  They	  do	  not	  reflect	  defects,	  but	  instead	  demonstrate	  mere	  tendencies	  to	  affirm	  falsehoods	  that	  derive	  from	  general	  human	  nature.	  	  Our	  über-­‐rational	  superior,	  however,	  thinks	  of	  the	  ordinary	  reasoner	  as	  defective	  in	  just	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  fallacious	  reasoner,	  but	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree.	  I	  do	  not	  see	  what	  resources	  Sosa	  has	  to	  reject	  her	  opinion	  on	  the	  matter.	  
1.6.	  Virtue	  without	  intuition?	  Let	  us	  take	  stock.	  Sosa	  has	  attempted	  to	  apply	  his	  attractive	  general	  virtue	  theoretic	  epistemology	  to	  the	  case	  of	  intuitive	  justification.	  But	  we	  have	  seen	  two	  respects	  into	  which	  Sosa’s	  treatment	  of	  intuitions	  fits	  awkwardly	  into	  this	  general	  picture.	  First,	  although	  it	  is	  plausible	  enough	  to	  evaluate	  intuitions	  as	  justified	  or	  unjustified,	  by	  extension	  of	  the	  virtue-­‐theoretic	  treatment	  of	  belief,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  why	  it	  should	  turn	  out,	  as	  Sosa	  wants,	  that	  there	  is	  an	  intimate	  connection	  between	  justified	  intuition	  and	  justified	  belief.	  Second,	  considerations	  involving	  fallacious	  reasoning	  were	  taken	  prima	  facie	  to	  motivate	  a	  requirement	  that	  only	  true	  intuitions	  can	  justify;	  Sosa’s	  attempt	  to	  diffuse	  this	  motivation	  was,	  I	  suggested,	  unconvincing.	  False	  rational	  intuitions	  always	  constitute	  a	  rational	  failure.	  I	  rather	  suspect	  that	  the	  error	  here	  lies	  more	  with	  in	  treatment	  of	  intuitions	  than	  with	  the	  virtue	  epistemology.	  Here,	  briefly,	  is	  a	  competing	  approach	  to	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  a	  priori,	  motivated	  by	  a	  kindred	  general	  approach	  to	  epistemology,	  that	  may	  bring	  these	  features	  of	  Sosa’s	  view	  into	  clearer	  relief.	  It	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  anything	  like	  the	  only	  competing	  view	  available,	  but	  it	  is	  one	  that	  may	  provide	  an	  instructive	  foil.	  If	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  intuitions	  fit	  oddly	  into	  the	  epistemology	  of	  intuitive	  judgment,	  we	  can	  consider	  telling	  a	  story	  of	  the	  latter	  that	  does	  not	  afford	  a	  central	  role	  to	  intuitions	  themselves.	  We	  may	  admit	  that	  there	  are	  such	  things	  as	  intuitions—attractions	  to	  assent	  of	  a	  certain	  sort—while	  denying	  that	  they	  play	  any	  fundamental	  role	  in	  justifying	  assent.	  Our	  story	  of	  justified	  assent	  can	  be	  the	  straightforward	  virtue-­‐theoretic	  one:	  a	  judgment	  is	  justified	  just	  in	  case	  it	  is	  the	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product	  of	  an	  epistemic	  competence—this,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  in	  any	  sense	  grounded	  in	  an	  intuition,	  or,	  if	  it	  is,	  whether	  or	  not	  that	  intuition	  itself	  is	  justified.	  The	  reason	  it’s	  useful	  to	  have	  justified	  intuitions	  is	  that	  justified	  intuitions	  tend	  to	  attract	  assent	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  truth.	  What	  intuitions	  a	  subject	  has	  will	  causally	  affect	  her	  dispositions	  to	  judge.	  So	  they	  have	  a	  psychological	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  establishing	  of	  competence,	  and	  hence	  virtuous	  performance.	  But	  the	  epistemological	  action	  is	  at	  the	  level	  of	  competence	  generally;	  the	  role	  of	  intuitions	  is	  exhausted	  in	  helping	  to	  fix	  the	  competences.	  On	  such	  an	  approach,	  we	  will	  not	  have	  any	  general	  constraint	  on	  what	  kinds	  of	  intuitions	  can	  enter	  into	  justified	  beliefs;	  a	  belief	  is	  justified	  if	  it	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  disposition	  that	  is	  a	  competence—whether	  or	  not	  an	  unjustified	  intuition	  played	  some	  role	  in	  influencing	  that	  disposition.	  And	  since	  on	  this	  approach	  intuitions	  do	  not	  themselves	  justify,	  but	  only	  play	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  establishing	  the	  dispositions	  that	  underwrite	  justification,	  we	  need	  not	  say	  as	  Sosa	  does	  that	  some	  false	  intuitions	  justify	  and	  are	  justified,	  while	  others	  do	  not;	  we	  say	  only	  that	  intuitions	  are	  part	  of	  the	  psychological	  story	  underwriting	  justification.	  And	  we	  can	  maintain	  the	  Cartesian	  idea	  that	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  a	  priori,	  false	  intuitions	  are	  always	  in	  some	  sense	  defective:	  they	  always	  in	  some	  sense	  pull	  us	  away	  from	  the	  truth.	  But	  of	  course,	  we	  may	  and	  should	  overcome	  them	  and	  believe	  virtuously	  anyway.	  It	  is	  even	  possible	  that	  a	  subject	  could	  judge	  virtuously	  in	  a	  way	  intimately	  and	  essentially	  involving	  a	  vicious	  intuition;	  suppose	  one	  is	  so	  calibrated	  as	  to	  reliably	  intuit	  wrongly	  in	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  domain.	  One	  knows	  of	  oneself	  that	  he	  has	  a	  strong	  tendency	  to	  be	  pulled	  away	  from	  the	  truth	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  question.	  Such	  a	  subject	  could	  in	  some	  circumstances	  judge	  that	  p	  
precisely	  because	  of	  his	  intuition	  that	  not-­‐p;	  the	  judgment	  might	  be	  virtuous,	  and	  the	  intuitive	  vicious.	  (This	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  very	  unusual	  sort	  of	  case.)	  I	  tentatively	  suggest,	  then,	  that	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  intuitions	  may	  be	  exaggerated.	  One	  can	  have	  a	  virtue-­‐theoretic	  approach	  to	  the	  epistemology	  of	  intuitive	  judgment	  that	  is	  broadly	  in	  Sosa’s	  spirit	  without	  affording	  a	  central	  role	  to	  intuitions	  themselves.	  I	  have	  suggested	  a	  few	  respects	  in	  which	  this	  may	  be	  preferable.	  
2.	  Challenges	  to	  intuition	  We	  turn	  now	  from	  Sosa’s	  positive	  articulation	  of	  the	  epistemic	  role	  that	  intuitions	  may	  play,	  to	  his	  defensive	  response	  to	  recent	  attacks	  on	  the	  use	  of	  intuition	  in	  philosophy.	  These	  attacks	  are,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  somewhat	  general.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  although	  Sosa’s	  particular	  positive	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  intuitions	  in	  philosophy	  is	  among	  those	  potentially	  impugned	  by	  these	  critiques,	  they	  are	  not	  distinctive	  to	  it.	  Even	  philosophers	  who	  do	  not	  accept	  Sosa’s	  approach	  to	  intuitions	  ought	  to	  reckon	  with	  at	  least	  some	  of	  these	  critiques.	  And	  Sosa’s	  defenses	  of	  intuition	  do	  not,	  on	  the	  whole,	  depend	  substantially	  on	  the	  specifics	  of	  his	  own	  positive	  view.	  So	  the	  material	  of	  this	  section	  should	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  anyone	  interested	  in	  methodological	  questions	  about	  philosophy,	  whether	  or	  not	  she	  accepts	  Sosa’s	  views	  articulated	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	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2.1.	  Calibration	  One	  critique	  of	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  in	  philosophy	  concerns	  our	  ability	  to	  discern	  whether	  intuitions	  are	  reliable;	  the	  canonical	  presentation	  of	  this	  worry	  is	  Cummins	  (1998).	  Cummins	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  apparent	  fact	  that	  we	  lack	  independent	  means	  of	  verifying	  the	  reliability	  of	  our	  intuitions;	  since,	  Cummins	  says,	  within	  realms	  such	  as	  logic,	  mathematics,	  and	  the	  a	  priori	  parts	  of	  philosophy,	  our	  only	  access	  to	  the	  domains	  in	  question	  comes	  via	  intuition,	  if	  our	  intuitions	  were	  systematically	  misleading,	  then	  we	  would	  have	  no	  way	  to	  correct	  the	  error.	  We	  lack	  independent	  grounds	  on	  which	  we	  can	  calibrate	  intuitions.	  In	  response,	  Sosa	  points	  out	  that	  the	  case	  against	  intuition	  here	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  stronger	  than	  an	  analogous	  case	  for	  radical	  skepticism.	  The	  calibration	  objection,	  if	  effective	  against	  intuitions	  will	  prove	  a	  skeptical	  quicksand	  that	  engulfs	  all	  knowledge,	  not	  just	  the	  intuitive.	  No	  source	  will	  then	  survive,	  since	  none	  can	  be	  calibrated	  without	  eventual	  self-­‐dependence.	  That	  is	  so	  at	  least	  for	  sources	  broadly	  enough	  conceived:	  as,	  say,	  memory,	  introspection,	  and	  perception.	  None	  of	  these	  can	  be	  defended	  epistemically	  as	  reliable	  unless	  allowed	  to	  yield	  some	  of	  the	  data	  to	  be	  used	  in	  its	  own	  defense.18	  And	  if,	  Sosa	  goes	  on	  to	  point	  out,	  one	  attempts	  to	  defend	  perception	  by,	  say,	  corroborating	  sight	  with	  sound,	  or	  one	  person’s	  perception	  with	  another’s,	  it	  is	  entirely	  plausible	  that	  the	  same	  defense	  may	  well	  apply	  to	  the	  case	  of	  intuition.	  In	  general,	  the	  assimilation	  of	  skeptical	  worries	  about	  intuition	  into	  general	  skeptical	  worries	  to	  which	  all	  nonskeptics	  are	  committed	  to	  denying	  is	  a	  powerful	  and	  effective	  move	  characteristic	  of	  Sosa’s	  work	  on	  intuition.	  For	  an	  application	  of	  the	  strategy	  to	  another	  set	  of	  worries,	  see	  Sosa	  (1998)	  pp.	  266-­‐68.	  
2.2.	  Experimentalist	  critiques	  More	  recently,	  experimental	  philosophers	  have	  mounted	  an	  empirically	  based	  challenge	  to	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  in	  philosophy.	  For	  example,	  Weinberg,	  Nichols,	  and	  Stich	  (2001)	  surveyed	  Rutgers	  undergraduate	  students	  about	  various	  epistemological	  thought	  experiments,	  and	  found	  not	  only	  that	  some	  students	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  standard	  intuitions	  epistemologists	  typically	  rely	  upon,	  but	  also	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  ethnic	  background	  correlated	  with	  epistemic	  judgment.	  For	  example,	  students	  with	  an	  East	  Asian	  ethnic	  background	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  than	  Western-­‐descended	  students	  to	  describe	  subjects	  in	  Gettier	  cases	  as	  ‘really	  knowing’	  the	  contents	  in	  question.	  According	  to	  experimentalist	  critics,	  experiments	  like	  this	  one—and	  others	  that	  followed	  it—cast	  significant	  doubt	  on	  the	  propriety	  of	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  in	  philosophy.	  Ernest	  Sosa	  has	  engaged	  extensively	  with	  these	  experimentalist	  critiques.	  One	  of	  his	  significant	  contributions	  involves	  the	  interpretation	  of	  survey	  data	  involving	  thought	  experiments;	  we	  needn’t	  assume,	  Sosa	  suggests,	  that	  they	  reflect	  genuine	  disagreement.	  Another,	  which	  comes	  out	  in	  some	  of	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Sosa	  (2007a)	  pp.	  63-­‐64.	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exchanges	  with	  Stephen	  Stich,	  concerns	  the	  normative	  significance	  of	  philosophical	  analysis.	  Let	  us	  consider	  these	  in	  turn.	  
2.3.	  Do	  Survey	  Results	  Reflect	  Disagreement?	  Epistemologists	  typically	  think	  that	  subjects	  in	  Gettier	  cases	  lack	  knowledge.	  Weinberg	  et.	  al.	  take	  themselves	  to	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  surprising	  number	  of	  people—a	  majority	  of	  American	  undergraduates	  of	  East	  Asian	  descent—disagree.	  But	  is	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  genuine	  disagreement	  here?	  Only	  on	  the	  assumption	  that,	  when	  the	  survey	  subjects	  say	  ‘the	  subject	  knows,’	  the	  word	  ‘knows’	  in	  this	  sentence	  refers	  to	  the	  same	  relation	  epistemologists	  are	  interested	  in.	  Sosa	  writes:	  And	  the	  disagreement	  may	  now	  perhaps	  be	  explained	  in	  a	  way	  that	  casts	  no	  doubt	  on	  intuition	  as	  a	  source	  of	  epistemic	  justification	  or	  even	  knowledge.	  Why	  not	  explain	  the	  disagreement	  as	  merely	  verbal?	  Why	  not	  say	  that	  across	  the	  divide	  we	  find	  somewhat	  different	  concepts	  picked	  out	  by	  terminology	  that	  is	  either	  ambiguous	  or	  at	  least	  contextually	  divergent?	  On	  the	  EA	  [East	  Asian]	  side,	  the	  more	  valuable	  status	  that	  a	  belief	  might	  attain	  is	  one	  that	  necessarily	  involves	  communitarian	  factors	  of	  one	  or	  another	  sort,	  factors	  that	  are	  absent	  or	  minimized	  in	  the	  status	  picked	  out	  by	  Ws	  [Westerners]	  as	  necessary	  for	  “knowledge.”	  If	  there	  is	  such	  divergence	  in	  meaning	  as	  we	  cross	  the	  relevant	  divides,	  then	  once	  again	  we	  fail	  to	  have	  disagreement	  on	  the	  very	  same	  propositions.	  In	  saying	  that	  the	  subject	  does	  not	  know,	  the	  EAs	  are	  saying	  something	  about	  lack	  of	  some	  relevant	  communitarian	  status.	  In	  saying	  that	  the	  subject	  does	  know,	  the	  Ws	  are	  not	  denying	  that;	  they	  are	  simply	  focusing	  on	  a	  different	  status,	  one	  that	  they	  regard	  as	  desirable	  even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  high	  communitarian	  requirements	  important	  to	  the	  EAs.	  So	  again	  we	  avoid	  any	  real	  disagreement	  on	  the	  very	  same	  propositions.	  The	  proposition	  affirmed	  by	  the	  EAs	  as	  intuitively	  true	  is	  not	  the	  very	  same	  as	  the	  proposition	  denied	  by	  the	  Ws	  as	  intuitively	  false.19	  Sosa’s	  suggestion	  here	  is	  this:	  maybe	  there’s	  no	  real	  disagreement	  here;	  some	  group	  of	  subjects	  say	  that	  such	  and	  such	  ‘is	  a	  case	  of	  knowledge,’	  while	  philosophers	  and	  other	  subjects	  say	  that	  such	  and	  such	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  there’s	  no	  genuine	  disagreement,	  because	  the	  former	  subjects	  don’t	  mean	  knowledge	  by	  ‘knowledge’.	  The	  suggestion	  does	  of	  course	  correspond	  to	  a	  genuine	  possibility;	  there	  is	  nothing	  incoherent	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  superficially	  similar	  language	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  distinct,	  subtly	  different	  languages—perhaps	  we’d	  rather	  say	  idiolects—where	  some	  words	  take	  slightly	  different	  meanings.	  British	  English	  and	  American	  English	  plausibly	  stand	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  relationship,	  and	  competent	  speakers	  may	  sometimes	  fall	  into	  accidental	  verbal	  disagreement	  in	  discussions	  about	  eating	  ‘biscuits’	  or	  ‘grilling’	  vegetables.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Sosa	  (2009)	  p.	  108.	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I	  doubt,	  however,	  that	  the	  possibility	  Sosa	  raises	  will	  ultimately	  prove	  a	  very	  plausible	  one	  in	  this	  instance.	  As	  Sosa	  notes,	  verbal	  confusions	  of	  the	  kind	  at	  issue	  here	  comprise	  cases	  where	  disquotation	  fails:	  a.	  S	  says	  “There	  is	  a	  bank	  nearby.”	  b.	  S	  says	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bank	  nearby.	  To	  move	  from	  a	  to	  b	  is	  to	  disquote.	  The	  move	  is	  enthymematic,	  and	  requires	  some	  such	  assumption	  as	  this:	  In	  saying	  “There	  is	  a	  bank	  nearby”	  S	  means	  that	  there	  is	  a	  bank	  nearby.	  In	  asserting	  b,	  I	  must	  mean	  something	  specific:	  for	  example,	  I	  cannot	  mean	  both	  financial	  institution	  and	  river	  bank.20	  So	  disquotation	  is	  legitimate	  only	  when	  the	  terms	  are	  used	  univocally.	  Consequently,	  Sosa’s	  suggestion	  about	  the	  subjects	  of	  East	  Asian	  descent	  who	  wanted	  to	  say	  “the	  subject	  knows”—that	  they	  in	  fact	  are	  expressing	  no	  disagreement	  with	  traditional	  epistemologists’	  commitment	  to	  the	  truth	  of	  our	  sentence	  “the	  subject	  does	  not	  know”—entails	  that	  this	  is	  a	  case	  where	  disquotation	  fails.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  Sosa’s	  strategy	  that	  it	  is	  correct	  to	  report	  the	  survey	  reports	  by	  saying	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  subjects	  of	  East	  Asian	  descent	  thought	  that	  the	  Gettier	  cases	  were	  cases	  of	  knowledge.	  This	  is,	  however,	  (I	  submit)	  a	  fairly	  radical	  suggestion.	  It	  is	  extremely	  natural	  to	  describe	  the	  experiment	  as	  one	  in	  which	  subjects	  expressed	  judgments	  about	  whether	  fictional	  characters	  had	  knowledge.	  Absent	  any	  particular	  reason	  to	  think	  otherwise,	  pointing	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  might	  not	  does	  not	  have	  much	  dialectical	  force.	  The	  point	  is,	  of	  course,	  closely	  analogous	  to	  the	  one	  Tyler	  Burge	  makes	  in	  his	  classic	  (1979):	  Oscar	  believes	  he	  has	  arthritis,	  and	  he	  expresses	  the	  belief	  with	  the	  sentence	  “I	  have	  arthritis,”	  so	  his	  word	  “arthritis”	  means	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  his	  doctor’s	  (viz.,	  arthritis).	  Furthermore,	  supposing	  that	  the	  reason	  the	  survey	  reports	  did	  not	  express	  beliefs	  about	  knowledge	  is	  that	  quite	  generally,	  these	  subjects	  mean	  something	  other	  than	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  the	  word	  “knows,”	  it	  would	  follow	  quite	  generally	  that	  disquotation	  fails	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  subjects’	  “knowledge”	  sentences.	  Suppose	  I	  overhear	  one	  of	  my	  students	  asking	  a	  classmate,	  “do	  you	  know	  what	  time	  it	  is?”	  If	  Sosa’s	  suggestion	  is	  correct,	  and	  my	  student	  is	  of	  East	  Asian	  ethnic	  descent,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  incorrect	  for	  me	  to	  describe	  my	  student	  as	  having	  asked	  if	  her	  classmate	  knew	  what	  time	  it	  was.	  This	  is	  somewhat	  incredible.	  My	  objection	  to	  Sosa’s	  suggestion	  is	  not	  the	  main	  one	  that	  has	  been	  advanced	  by	  experimental	  philosophers,	  although	  it	  does	  enjoy	  certain	  affinities	  with	  it.	  As	  I	  do,	  they	  challenge	  Sosa	  with	  having	  done	  little	  more	  than	  showing	  a	  way	  for	  it	  to	  be	  possible	  that	  intuitions	  are	  not	  challenged	  by	  the	  experimental	  data;	  he	  does	  not	  go	  at	  all	  far	  toward	  showing	  that	  they	  are	  not	  in	  fact	  challenged.21	  A	  central	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Sosa	  (2010a),	  p.	  419.	  21	  E.g.	  Stich	  (2009)	  p.	  233.	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characteristic	  of	  the	  debate	  at	  this	  stage	  seems	  to	  involve	  argumentative	  attempts	  to	  shift	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  between	  the	  defender	  and	  the	  skeptic	  about	  intuition;	  I	  do	  not	  have	  much	  of	  substantive	  evaluation	  to	  offer	  at	  this	  juncture,	  so	  I	  merely	  point	  to	  the	  debate	  and	  move	  on.	  One	  difference	  between	  my	  worry	  for	  Sosa’s	  line	  here	  and	  the	  sort	  often	  presented	  by	  experimentalists—as,	  for	  instance,	  by	  Stich	  (2009)—is	  that	  my	  challenge	  is	  framed	  at	  a	  relatively	  intuitive	  level.	  Certain	  disquotational	  moves	  are	  intuitively	  permissible,	  but	  cannot	  be	  permissible	  if	  there	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  meaning	  divergence	  Sosa	  suggests;	  so	  positing	  such	  divergence	  has	  a	  high	  intuitive	  cost.	  The	  extant	  debates	  about	  Sosa’s	  suggestion	  often	  end	  up	  involving	  questions	  about	  concept	  individuation.	  This	  is	  in	  my	  view	  at	  best	  a	  distraction.	  The	  question	  is	  ultimately	  one	  about	  meaning	  and	  reference:	  what	  does	  the	  word	  ‘knowledge’	  refer	  to	  in	  a	  given	  subject’s	  mouth?	  Perhaps	  one	  can	  involve	  concepts	  if	  one	  likes:	  word	  meanings	  are	  concepts;	  the	  concepts	  are	  different;	  so	  the	  word	  is	  ambiguous.	  But	  what,	  if	  anything,	  does	  this	  ‘conceptual	  ascent’	  contribute?	  Steve	  Stich’s	  response	  to	  Sosa	  emphasizes	  concepts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  looks	  to	  me	  largely	  irrelevant:	  There	  is	  a	  vast	  literature	  on	  concepts	  in	  philosophy	  and	  in	  psychology…,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  individuate	  concepts	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  hotly	  debated	  issues	  in	  that	  literature.	  While	  it	  is	  widely	  agreed	  that	  for	  two	  concept	  tokens	  to	  be	  of	  the	  same	  type	  they	  must	  have	  the	  same	  content,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  diversity	  of	  views	  on	  what	  is	  required	  for	  this	  condition	  to	  be	  met.	  On	  some	  theories,	  the	  sort	  of	  covert	  ambiguity	  that	  Sosa	  is	  betting	  on	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  fairly	  common,	  while	  on	  others	  covert	  ambiguity	  is	  much	  harder	  to	  generate.	  For	  Fodor,	  for	  example,	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  East	  Asian	  pays	  more	  attention	  to	  communitarian	  factors	  while	  a	  Westerner	  emphasizes	  individualistic	  factors	  in	  applying	  the	  term	  ‘knowledge’	  would	  be	  no	  reason	  at	  all	  to	  think	  that	  the	  concepts	  linked	  to	  their	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘knowledge’	  have	  different	  contents.	  To	  this	  Sosa	  replies,	  reasonably	  enough,	  that	  articulating	  and	  defending	  a	  theory	  of	  concept	  individuation	  is	  a	  lot	  to	  ask	  of	  a	  theorist	  looking	  to	  diagnose	  a	  verbal	  dispute.22	  It	  is	  entirely	  possible,	  in	  many	  cases,	  to	  recognize	  verbal	  disputes	  at	  the	  intuitive	  level.	  I	  agree	  about	  the	  methodological	  claim,	  even	  if,	  as	  indicated	  above,	  I	  disagree	  about	  its	  verdict	  in	  particular	  instances.	  Sosa	  cites,	  in	  favor	  of	  his	  suggestion,	  the	  famous	  example	  of	  William	  James:	  That	  example	  is	  interesting	  when	  juxtaposed	  with	  one	  due	  to	  William	  James,	  worth	  quoting	  in	  full.	  …	  SOME	  YEARS	  AGO,	  being	  with	  a	  camping	  party	  in	  the	  mountains,	  I	  returned	  from	  a	  solitary	  ramble	  to	  find	  every	  one	  engaged	  in	  a	  ferocious	  metaphysical	  dispute.	  The	  corpus	  of	  the	  dispute	  was	  a	  squirrel	  –	  a	  live	  squirrel	  supposed	  to	  be	  clinging	  to	  one	  side	  of	  a	  tree-­‐trunk;	  while	  over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Sosa	  (2010a).	  
	   http://jonathanichikawa.net/papers/vipm.pdf	  
vipm	   18	   ichikawa	  
against	  the	  tree’s	  opposite	  side	  a	  human	  being	  was	  imagined	  to	  stand.	  This	  human	  witness	  tries	  to	  get	  sight	  of	  the	  squirrel	  by	  moving	  rapidly	  round	  the	  tree,	  but	  no	  matter	  how	  fast	  he	  goes,	  the	  squirrel	  moves	  as	  fast	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	  and	  always	  keeps	  the	  tree	  between	  himself	  and	  the	  man,	  so	  that	  never	  a	  glimpse	  of	  him	  is	  caught.	  The	  resultant	  metaphysical	  problem	  now	  is	  this:	  Does	  the	  man	  go	  round	  the	  squirrel	  or	  not?	  He	  goes	  round	  the	  tree,	  sure	  enough,	  and	  the	  squirrel	  is	  on	  the	  tree;	  but	  does	  he	  go	  round	  the	  squirrel?	  In	  the	  unlimited	  leisure	  of	  the	  wilderness,	  discussion	  had	  been	  worn	  threadbare.	  Every	  one	  had	  taken	  sides,	  and	  was	  obstinate;	  and	  the	  numbers	  on	  both	  sides	  were	  even.	  Each	  side,	  when	  I	  appeared	  therefore	  appealed	  to	  me	  to	  make	  it	  a	  majority.	  Mindful	  of	  the	  scholastic	  adage	  that	  whenever	  you	  meet	  a	  contradiction	  you	  must	  make	  a	  distinction,	  I	  immediately	  sought	  and	  found	  one,	  as	  follows:	  “Which	  party	  is	  right,”	  I	  said,	  “depends	  on	  what	  you	  practically	  mean	  by	  ‘going	  round’	  the	  squirrel.	  If	  you	  mean	  passing	  from	  the	  north	  of	  him	  to	  the	  east,	  then	  to	  the	  south,	  then	  to	  the	  west,	  and	  then	  to	  the	  north	  of	  him	  again,	  obviously	  the	  man	  does	  go	  round	  him,	  for	  he	  occupies	  these	  successive	  positions.	  But	  if	  on	  the	  contrary	  you	  mean	  being	  first	  in	  front	  of	  him,	  then	  on	  the	  right	  of	  him,	  then	  behind	  him,	  then	  on	  his	  left,	  and	  finally	  in	  front	  again,	  it	  is	  quite	  as	  obvious	  that	  the	  man	  fails	  to	  go	  round	  him,	  for	  by	  the	  compensating	  movements	  the	  squirrel	  makes,	  he	  keeps	  his	  belly	  turned	  towards	  the	  man	  all	  the	  time,	  and	  his	  back	  turned	  away.	  Make	  the	  distinction,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  occasion	  for	  any	  farther	  dispute.	  You	  are	  both	  right	  and	  both	  wrong	  according	  as	  you	  conceive	  the	  verb	  ‘to	  go	  round’	  in	  one	  practical	  fashion	  or	  the	  other.”	  Here	  James	  appeals	  to	  no	  serious	  theory	  of	  content.	  He	  just	  offers	  two	  distinct	  things	  that	  can	  be	  meant	  in	  perfectly	  good	  English	  by	  the	  same	  words,	  such	  that	  if	  the	  words	  mean	  one	  thing	  then	  the	  target	  sentence	  is	  obviously	  true,	  while	  if	  they	  mean	  the	  other	  then	  it	  is	  obviously	  false.	  Dissolving	  this	  disagreement	  requires	  no	  theory	  of	  content.23	  I	  agree	  with	  Sosa	  that	  diagnosing	  the	  situation	  needn’t	  involve	  going	  very	  deeply	  into	  a	  theory	  of	  content.	  And	  perhaps	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  debate	  between	  James’s	  two	  parties	  is	  ‘merely	  verbal’.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  such	  a	  sense	  that	  licenses	  the	  move	  Sosa	  suggests	  in	  response	  to	  the	  experimentalist	  survey	  data—we	  have	  not	  managed	  to	  “avoid	  any	  real	  disagreement	  on	  the	  very	  same	  propositions.”	  There	  is	  genuine	  disagreement	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  man	  goes	  round	  the	  squirrel.24	  So	  Sosa	  considers	  the	  most	  central	  skeptical	  worries	  raised	  by	  experimental	  philosophers	  to	  be	  closely	  related	  to	  general	  worries	  that	  arise	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Sosa	  (2010a),	  pp.	  421-­‐22.	  24	  Chalmers	  (forthcoming)	  offers	  an	  approach	  to	  verbal	  disagreement	  that	  classifies	  James’s	  case	  as	  merely	  verbal,	  but	  points	  out	  that	  it	  is	  not	  plausibly	  regarded	  as	  one	  in	  which	  the	  participants	  are	  fail	  to	  disagree	  about	  any	  particular	  proposition.	  Chalmers	  is	  noncommittal	  about	  whether	  disputes	  about	  knowledge	  like	  the	  ones	  Sosa	  discusses	  are	  candidates	  for	  treatment	  as	  mere	  verbal	  disputes.	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disagreement	  about	  philosophical	  matters.	  The	  challenge,	  as	  Sosa	  often	  interprets	  it,	  is:	  what	  reason	  have	  we	  to	  think	  that	  our	  philosophical	  intuitions	  are	  right,	  since,	  surveys	  reveal,	  so	  many	  others	  think	  otherwise?25	  As	  Sosa	  points	  out,	  so	  understood,	  many	  of	  the	  particular	  challenges	  one	  faces	  here	  arise	  independently	  of	  experimentalist	  surveys;	  we	  know	  from	  our	  engagement	  with	  our	  philosophical	  colleagues	  that	  many	  of	  our	  philosophical	  judgments	  are	  controversial.26	  
2.4.	  Defeaters	  There	  are,	  however,	  other	  kinds	  of	  skeptical	  challenges	  that	  arise	  from	  this	  and	  related	  experimental	  work.	  Some	  articulations	  of	  the	  skeptical	  worries	  for	  traditional	  armchair	  philosophy	  emphasize	  that	  the	  experimental	  results	  demonstrate	  particular	  biases	  or	  errors	  to	  which	  we	  are	  vulnerable;	  this	  is	  thought	  to	  undermine	  our	  rational	  confidence	  in	  relying	  upon	  them.27	  Sosa	  provides	  the	  same	  response	  here	  that	  he	  offered	  to	  the	  calibration-­‐based	  objection	  discussed	  in	  §2.1:	  that	  there	  are	  potential	  sources	  of	  error	  and	  bias	  affecting	  intuition	  no	  more	  undermines	  the	  use	  of	  intuition	  in	  generality	  than	  do	  the	  corresponding	  errors	  in	  perceptual	  judgment	  mandate	  skepticism	  about	  the	  external	  world.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  perception,	  our	  propensity	  for	  intuitive	  errors	  provides	  us	  with	  reason	  to	  engage	  carefully	  with	  intuition,	  not	  to	  abandon	  intuition	  altogether.28	  
2.5.	  Arbitrariness	  A	  final	  way	  of	  presenting	  experimentalist	  worries	  involves	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  intuitions	  may	  be	  used	  to	  demonstrate	  anything	  of	  normative	  interest.	  For	  example,	  Stich	  (1993)	  argues	  that	  intuitions,	  being	  the	  product	  of	  our	  cultural	  upbringings,	  are	  fundamentally	  arbitrary	  in	  a	  way	  inconsistent	  for	  settling	  value	  matters,	  particularly	  in	  epistemology.	  Insofar	  as	  epistemology	  is	  a	  normative	  enterprise,	  to	  describe	  a	  state	  as	  knowledge	  is	  to	  commend	  it	  in	  a	  normatively	  significant	  kind	  of	  way.	  Of	  course	  Sosa	  the	  virtue	  epistemologist	  will	  have	  no	  quarrel	  here—see	  Sosa	  (2010b)—but,	  Stich	  continues,	  if	  we	  theorize	  about	  knowledge	  by	  consulting	  our	  intuitions,	  we	  proceed	  arbitrarily	  in	  a	  way	  inconsistent	  with	  knowledge’s	  alleged	  value.	  We	  could	  easily,	  Stich	  says,	  have	  been	  brought	  up	  in	  a	  culture	  which	  promotes	  different	  intuitions,	  in	  which	  case	  we	  would	  end	  up	  valuing	  differently;	  it	  is	  ‘xenophobic’	  to	  privilege	  our	  actual	  values	  to	  these	  hypothetical	  ones.	  Weinberg	  et.	  al.	  (2001)	  connects	  this	  critique	  explicitly	  to	  cross-­‐cultural	  survey	  results.	  Sosa’s	  response	  here,	  like	  his	  response	  to	  the	  disagreement	  data,	  is	  pluralist:	  perhaps	  it	  is	  so	  that	  different	  cultures	  end	  up	  embracing	  subtly	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  e.g.	  Sosa	  (2007c),	  p.	  102.	  26	  Sosa	  (2007b)	  pp.	  68-­‐69.	  27	  E.g.	  Swain,	  Alexander,	  and	  Weinberg	  (2008).	  28	  Sosa	  (2007c)	  p.	  105.	  Weinberg	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  this	  move	  is	  not	  available,	  because	  philosophical	  intuition	  is	  fallible	  in	  a	  way	  importantly	  worse	  than	  perceptual	  experience	  is;	  however,	  Ichikawa	  (forthcoming	  1)	  argues	  to	  the	  contrary.	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epistemic	  values.	  We	  need	  not	  quarrel	  with	  them.	  Indeed,	  in	  many	  cases,	  we	  can	  and	  should	  share	  their	  values	  as	  well.	  (Knowledge	  is	  good;	  so	  is	  justified	  true	  belief.)	  Here,	  unlike	  in	  the	  analogous	  case	  regarding	  interpretation	  of	  survey	  data,	  Sosa’s	  pluralist	  response	  strikes	  me	  as	  wholly	  correct.	  	  Although	  Stich	  argues	  otherwise	  in	  his	  (2009),	  I	  do	  consider	  Sosa’s	  arguments	  on	  this	  score	  rather	  more	  compelling.	  For	  a	  Sosa-­‐sympathetic	  rehearsal	  of	  the	  dialectic	  between	  Stich	  and	  Sosa,	  see	  Ichikawa	  (forthcoming	  2).29	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